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The Salafist Road to Sahelistan and Military-Centric International Response
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. […] Always remember, however sure you are that you could easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.
-Winston Churchill 1 Since the January 2012 combined Tuareg-Jihadist offensive and the March 2012 military coup, the international community had been elaborating a gradual and comprehensive response to the political, military and humanitarian aspects of the Malian crisis.
2 As per United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2071 and 2085, 3 an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was to deploy to
Mali in early 2013 alongside a European Union (EU) Training Mission (EUTM Mali).
AFISMA's initial mission was to assist in rebuilding the nation's armed forces and to support counteroffensive operations against the Jihadist northern strongholds. 4 AFISMA's mandate also included assisting the Malian authorities in consolidating state authority, maintaining security, protecting the population, and setting conditions necessary to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
5
While the initial plan had imperfections -notably an extended timeline with military operations scheduled for no earlier than late 2013 6 -it provided for three critical provisions: a comprehensive strategy addressing all facets of the problem, a progressive and inclusive methodology intended to produce broad international support, and an unobtrusive role assigned to state actors external to the African region. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) argues that by overreacting to a strategically inconsequential Jihadist thrust and shifting from the initial approach, the international community has traded a prudent, balanced, across-the-board, incremental and sustainable strategy for short-term tactical gains. While the benefits of these gains for the overall endeavour have questionable enduring value, the undermining impact to an inclusive and holistic approach to the Malian crisis is already apparent.
First, the precipitate start of offensive operations has short-circuited diplomatic efforts intended to bridge interest fissures and divergences among international stakeholders about the appropriate strategy. Those efforts were critical to strengthening the legitimacy and cohesiveness of the international community's response, to disarming the reservations of key regional actors such as Algeria and Mauritania, and to building a durable collective commitment.
Secondly, although uprooting the Jihadist footholds will inevitably require the use of force, a military-centric strategy dominated by kinetic activity is destined to prove counterproductive in the long term by overlooking political and societal dynamics that are fundamental to lasting stability in Mali. Most significantly, the political transition process -essential to restoring constitutional order -might be sidetracked, allowing the in Mali, have gained influence in the region by denouncing the "deviationism" and "materialist degeneration" of Sufi marabouts. 36 Although apolitical and dedicated to pacifist daawa (predication), these movements nevertheless propagated more literalist interpretations of Islamic canons, while their "highly restrictive orthopraxis" and hostility towards modernism operated as pre-radicalizing incubators for some of their hard-core adepts. 37 For instance, the French-Moroccan Zacarias Moussaoui, condemned in the United States for his implication in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was a member of Tablighi Jamaat, along with the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh, and an estimated 80% of the Salafists recruited in Europe. 38 Wahhabi influences also irradiated the region through Islamic cultural centers, The weaknesses in the international community's cohesiveness towards the Malian crisis stem principally from the compelling and unshared nature of French strategic interests in the region and the resulting impulse for France to embark upon a solitary military enterprise in the Sahel. 48 As President Hollande put it: "Only France could decide and make this intervention." 49 Indeed, beyond responding to an isolated emergency -the Jihadist January 2013 attacks -the French military intervention is the manifestation of a deliberate and pragmatic strategy that, for the pursuit of broader objectives, assumed the risks and political implications of unilateral action. 50 In other terms, the operational urgency mutated into an "opportunity," allowing France to implement a strategy that pursues more enduring national interests. 51 French Defense
Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian expressed explicitly the French deep motivations in November 2012: "In Mali, it is our own security that is at stake … because if we don't move a terrorist entity will take shape which could hit … France … [or] Europe." 52 This explains why France assumed the risk of isolation from its natural North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU partners. This is also the reason why
France's natural allies, who do not necessarily share its concerns with the same intensity and are consequently not ready to assume the same risks, agreed to provide only symbolic support to the campaign. 53 They may even have felt that France seized the opportunity of the current military offensive to try to pressure them into endorsing the military-centric international approach that it advocated since the beginning, but which failed to overcome American and European reticence. 54 In any case, they resisted the pressure, maintained a policy of non-direct military intervention, and restated the necessity of seeking a comprehensive political solution. 55 This is the position, common to the United States and European Union nations, that German Foreign Minister -Guido Westerwelle -expressed:
It was right that France responded to the request for help from the Malian government (but) the deployment of German combat troops is not up for debate. A lasting resolution to the Mali conflict can only occur through a political solution that includes a return to order in the whole of Mali, taking into account the justified concerns of the north. 56 Indeed, France is the only Western nation to view the crisis in the Sahel as a direct and immediate threat to its natural security interests. 57 Among these interests, the fate of the French citizens detained by the Sahelian Jihadists is certainly paramount, from both humanitarian and domestic political perspectives. 58 From the standpoint of more enduring interests, protecting the nearly 150,000 French nationals living in West and North Africa and thwarting the extension of the threat into French territory certainly is also decisive. 59 Additionally, France has important economic interests in the broader region, especially the AREVA Company's uranium extraction activities at Arlit and Akokan in Niger. 60 With 78% of the national production of electricity generated by nuclear reactors, the security and stability of uranium supplies is critical to France's energy independence. 61 Moreover, in 2013, AREVA will begin to exploit the Nigerien Imouraren deposit, the second largest open-pit uranium mine in the world, making Niger the world's second largest uranium producer after Kazakhstan. 62 Protecting these facilities and preventing nuclear material from falling into malicious hands most certainly influenced direct intervention. 63 
13
Despite the support of the nations of its former "pré-carré," the French option for a unilateral approach drove a wedge into the cohesiveness of the international community's posture and disrupted the multilateral framework provided initially by the UNSC, the AU and ECOWAS. 64 It also compromised a further involvement of Western nations scared off by mission creep and unwilling to compromise democratic principles by allying with a "putschist" Malian military, MNLA insurgents once connected to the Jihadists, and a Chadian autocratic president eager to buy himself a new virginity.
Moreover, U.S. restraint from further involvement in the Malian crisis is a serious concern. The U.S. was playing an active role in developing a multilateral and comprehensive international approach. For instance, U.S. diplomacy was making critical effort in winning the cooperation of Algeria and pressuring Malian political actors into completing the transition process. 65 However, the ambivalence, unclear long-term objectives, and shortsighted construct of the French military intervention reinforced U.S.
reservations to the point that American officials have stepped back from the issue. 66 Furthermore, the crisis in the Sahel remains a remote threat to American national security interests and cannot compete for attention with more pressing concerns in the Middle East and Asia Pacific regions. 67 There is no ideal course of action in a situation of chaos and political meltdown such as the Malian crisis. However, as with comparable cases throughout Africa, the roots of the problem -the collapse of an artificial nation-state edifice inherited from the former colonial master -are notoriously unresponsive to short-term military-centric solutions. Decisive progress will come instead at an "evolutionary pace" and will require "strategic patience" and circumspection; any approach that does not match the absorption and processing capacities of the region will be invasive and disruptive in the long term. States principally, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) "performed better than anyone would have dreamed," thanks to a broad legitimacy, strong unity of action, a realistic timeframe and a comprehensive strategy focused on consolidating gains incrementally. 101 Together with proving that African regional forces are capable of complex peace enforcement missions, AMISOM also showed that they are less disruptive for the long-term stability of their areas of operations.
102
Most importantly, the restoration of constitutional order should receive priority over military considerations. Specifically, credible elections must take place as soon as practicable to reinstate legitimate Malian political authorities. However, the electoral process, despite France's pressure to hold elections in July 2013, must take the time necessary to ensure a credible vote, and should not jump the gun to provide an exit card to the French military.
its readiness to refer pertinent violations to competent international jurisdictions. In conjunction, AFISMA should receive the mandate to protect Malian institutions and transitional authorities.
Additionally, political processes designed to address the status of the northern regions and the Tuareg discontent must be part of the overall strategy. Given the objective shortcomings of the Malian state, a broad political compromise granting a measure of autonomy to the regions seems to be a realistic solution. In doing so, the international community must be cautious not to over-legitimize the MNLA and embolden it as an alternative to the Malian state.
The Malian security forces, essential for an exit strategy, should receive robust assistance in organization, training, and equipment. Bolstered aerial capacities, in particular, should give them a tactical advantage and allow them to face their operational duties in the northern desert. Moreover, the Malian political authorities should be encouraged to replace the discredited military leadership and facilitate the rise of a new generation of commanders.
These measures will allow the international community to avoid falling into the morass of a protracted and expanding "terrorsurgency," interethnic clashes, and a humanitarian disaster, ultimately giving reality to the looming Sahelistan. However, excessive consideration for the sovereignty of the Malian state is a sure path to stagnation and stalemate. The international community must acknowledge the failure of the Malian state and its central role in the development of the crisis and assume its legitimate authority to implement the strategy that it deems the most fitting for the durable security and wellbeing of the Malian people.
